

Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication

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Summary: For Peter Auriol, in an essential predication, e.g. Socrates is a human being, the very same thing grasped by different concepts is predicated of itself. This paper attempts to clarify Auriol's theory of essential predication, by examining it against the background both of how he thinks that singular extra-mental objects relate to the universal concepts our minds form of them, and of his theory of first intentions more generally.

In the course of lecturing on the second book of the *Sentences* at Paris, probably in 1317-18, while discussing universals and essential predication, Peter Auriol makes the claim that when I say 'Socrates is a human being', I am merely predicating one and the same thing, i.e. Socrates, of itself. That is to say, what is posited in the subject and predicate terms of an essential predication are one and the same thing.¹ Auriol goes on to explain this position by saying that:

... speaking about the thing (*re*) with respect to (*in ordine ad*) the intellect, which cognizes the same thing by different concepts when it takes Socrates as Socrates and as a human being – because it is the nature of every singular thing to make one more concept of itself, and the one is more widely known than the other, [and] through the more widely known concept (*quem*) [the singular thing] makes more clear (*declarat*) the less widely known concept (*illum*) – [speaking] in this way the same thing [grasped] by a known concept is predicated of itself [grasped] by an unknown concept, for one and the same thing is [grasped] by each of these concepts.²

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1 Peter Auriol, *Rep. in Secundum*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 1, p. 105bF-106aA: "... dico quod non praedicatur alia res quam Sorteitas cum dicitur 'Sortes est homo'. Ad inconveniens quod adducitur, quod idem praedicaretur de se, dico quantum ad rem, ita est, vere enim secundum rem eadem est res quae ponitur in subiecto et quae ponitur in praedicatione."

2 Ibid., p. 105bF-106aA: "Sed loquendo de re in ordine ad intellectum, qui cognoscit eandem rem alio et alio conceptu cum accipit Sortem ut Sortem et ut

What is involved in propositions like ‘Socrates is a human being’ or ‘a human being is an animal’, for Auriol, is the repetition of the very same singular thing grasped by different concepts. There is a real identity of subject and predicate – both are Socrates – but there is a conceptual difference, the more universal predicate concept elucidating the less universal subject concept.

In what follows, I want to begin to answer the question: “what does Auriol mean when he says that ‘Socrates’ and ‘human being’ are the same thing grasped by different concepts?” Another way to put this question is: “for Auriol, how does a singular thing relate to the universal concepts our minds form of it and how do these universal concepts relate to each other?” To answer these questions, I will first investigate the way that Auriol thinks that universal concepts are grounded on extra-mental things. In 1913, Raymond Dreiling, in *Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienlehre des Petrus Aureoli*, argued that, for Auriol, universals are purely intellectual fabrications with no direct ground in extra-mental reality.³ According to Dreiling, for Auriol universal concepts arise from the more or less exact qualitative resemblance that we perceive exists between individuals of the same species, genus, etc. Yet, as we have seen in the quotation above, Auriol claims that “it is the **nature** (*nata est*) of every singular thing to make one more concept of itself”, and this at least suggests a different interpretation than Dreiling’s. In fact, I will show that, for Auriol, there is a direct extra-mental ground for our universal concepts: there is, e.g., a characteristic innate to each and every member of the same genus that upon intellectual acquaintance leads us to form the concept of that genus. After examining Auriol’s ideas on the formation of

hominem – quaelibet enim res singularis nata est facere de se alium conceptum, et unum notioem altero, per quem declarat illum – et sic eadem res sub conceptu noto praedicatur de se sub conceptu ignoto, est enim res omnino una sub unoquoque conceptu”

³ See Dreiling 1913: 85-149, e.g. p. 144: “Da die Einheit der Art ... nur in der qualitativen Ähnlichkeit der partikulären Dinge besteht, bezeichnet der Artbegriff weder das allgemeine noch indifferente noch partikuläre Wesen der partikulären Dinge, sondern nur deren qualitative Ähnlichkeit.” Dreiling’s misinterpretation seems to stem from not knowing Auriol’s distinction between concepts that differ according to *rationes* and concepts that differ according to *modi concipiendi* – precisely the distinction for Auriol between concepts that differ on account of a direct extra-mental basis and concepts that differ purely on account of differing psychological states (see below).

universal concepts, I will show the role that Auriol's theory of concepts or – what is the same for him – intellectual intentions plays in his theory of essential predication.

Contraction, Explication, and *rationes*: The Formation of Universal Concepts

A ramification of Auriol's view in the quotation above, a ramification that he explicitly accepts elsewhere, is that the more widely known genus concept (e.g., animal) is predicated of and elucidates the less widely known species concept (e.g., human being), and yet both concepts grasp one thing (e.g., Socrates).⁴ The way that the intellect forms less universal concepts from more universal ones is called by Auriol 'contraction'. Contraction begins with the most universal concept of all, the concept of being; from the concept of being less and less universal concepts are formed in a series of steps: from the concept of being to the concept of the most general genera to mediate genera and, eventually, to the most special species.⁵ Thus, the contraction from the concept of being to the concept of each and every most special species is a Porphyrian tree. What Auriol adds to the tree is a description both of the particular mental processes that take place in the contraction of one universal concept to another, and of the way an extramental singular acts as a basis for all of these concepts.

4 Auriol, *Scriptum*, d. 2, Sec. 11, n. 91, p. 597, ll. 29-45: "Est autem considerandum, cum perseitas reducat ad identitatem, – omnis namque praedicatio per se est ratione alicuius identitatis praedicati cum subiecto – quod secundum modos praedicandi per se oportet distingui modos identitatis. In primo ergo modo dicendi est identitas rei eiusdem repetitae sub alietate conceptus, ut cum dicitur: 'Sortes est homo'. Sortes enim non est aliud secundum rem quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quidditas eius, sicut Commentator dicit VII *Metaphysicae*, commento 20. Et in talibus quae sic idem sunt necesse est alterum extremorum vel utrumque immiscere operationem intellectus, et non esse penitus extra in natura; alterum quidem quia, licet Sortes sit extra, homo tamen qui praedicatur de eo non est extra; utrumque autem ut cum dicitur: 'Homo est animal'; nec enim homo qui praedicationem suscipit, nec animal quod praedicatur sunt extra. Nam de substantia, sola prima est extra intellectum, secunda vero in solo intellectu secundum Philosophum, quamvis alia fuerit opinio Platonis."

At least two redactions of Auriol's lectures on the first book of the *Sentences* survive; the relationship between them is still unclear. The work printed in 1596 and of which Buytaert edited the Prologue and first 8 distinctions in the 1950s is known

Contraction is the relation holding between two or more concepts. At the foundation, then, of Auriol's description of the formation of universal concepts is a distinction he draws between two different ways that concepts can relate to one another. <1> Concepts can differ according to their *rationes*, and this is a difference that depends on some aspect or characteristic of the extra-mental object of intellection. <2> Two concepts of the same *ratio*, however, can differ because that *ratio* is conceived more explicitly or more clearly in one concept than in another; this is a purely psychological difference, having no foundation in the extra-mental object. On the basis of these two different types of relations between concepts, Auriol gives the following description of the contraction of genus to species:

... one type of contraction comes about by the addition of a *ratio*, another type comes about through the explication of a *ratio* that had previously been implicit. Here one should note that both of these types of contraction are at work in the contraction of a genus to a species. The reason for this is that a genus indicates all of its species potentially and indeterminately, but only (*tamen*) as a part [of each of them]: e.g., animal indicates indeterminately all its species, but only by way of the sensible part (*tamen per modum partis quia per modum sensibilis*) [of each of those species] Therefore insofar as a genus indicates all its species implicitly, it is contracted by explication; but insofar as it indicates its species as a part [of them], it is contracted through the addition of a different *ratio*.⁶

as the *Scriptum*. The lesser known work goes under the name of *Reportatio in Primum Sententiarum*. All quotations from Auriol's *Rep. in Primum* below are from Stephen Brown's 1995 edition of the part of d. 2 that contains Auriol's reflections on the concept of being. As part of that article Brown gives the most recent overview of the problems associated with the double redaction of the first book of Auriol's *Sentences* commentary (pp. 200-207). Lauge Nielsen, Chris Schabel, and I are preparing an edition of the entire *Rep. in Primum*.

5 The best description of Auriol's ideas on the contraction and the explication of concepts are to be found in Brown 1964 (esp.: 353-64), Brown 1965 (esp.: 135-50).

6 *Rep. in Primum*, d. 2, pt. 2a, q. 1 in Brown 1995: 235-36: "... contractio quaedam est per additionem alterius rationis, quaedam est per explicationem eiusdem rationis prius tamen implicitae. Ubi nota quod in contractione generis ad speciem concurrunt ista duplex contractio. Cuius ratio est quod genus dicit in potentia et indeterminate omnes species sed tamen partialiter, sicut animal dicit indeterminate omnes species, tamen per modum partis quia per modum sensibilis Ratione igitur qua genus dicit implicite omnes species, ut sic, contrahitur per explicationem; in quantum vero dicit species per modum partis, ut sic, contrahitur per additionem rationis alterius."

A genus relates to its species in two ways according to Auriol. On the one hand a genus is a quidditative part of each and every one of its species: all species of animal are sensible. Insofar as the genus is a part of its species, the contraction of the one to the other comes about simply because we conceive the very same *ratio* – in the case of animal, sensibility – more clearly than we did before. For Auriol, we understand the *ratio* of the genus more clearly when we conceive it instantiated in a particular species within the range of the genus than when it is conceived in its own right. What Auriol seems to have in mind here is that when we think about ‘animal’ or ‘sensibility’ in the abstract we do not grasp clearly what these terms mean; we understand much better what it is to be an animal when we think about particular examples like dog, cow, and human being; these examples help clarify what it means to be sensible or an animal, without necessarily requiring us to deal with the specific difference, i.e. what it is that makes dog different from cow, and both of them different from human being. Now, Auriol tells us that this type of contraction depends only on the intellectual act, it has no basis in extra-mental reality.⁷ Thus, it is clear why Auriol calls this type of contraction **explication**: the extra-mental contribution to the content of the concept is the same at both the level of the genus and of the species, but the mind in a sense focuses on that same content so that it is understood more clearly at the level of the species.

On the other hand, a genus is **only** a part of each and every species in its range, and it must be supplemented by something that is quidditatively external to it: the specific difference. ‘Human being’ is not simply ‘animal’ conceived more clearly, it is ‘rational animal’. The *ratio* of the genus is not the total *ratio* of the species: the species is constituted from two *rationes*, the genus serving as a determinable substrate with respect to the determining specific difference, according to Auriol.⁸ Thus, when a genus is

⁷ See below n. 10.

⁸ *Rep. in Primum*, d. 2, pt. 2a, q. 1 in Brown 1995: 234: “... est considerandum quod aliqua possunt duobus modis convenire in tertio. Uno modo: quod illud tertium veniat ad constitutionem eorum per modum partis, aliquo addito, et per modum substrati, eo modo quo venit genus ad constitutionem speciei, quia venit per modum partis quia non est totalis ratio speciei, et aliquo addito, quia addita ratione differentiae quae est alia a ratione generis; et venit per modum substrati, venit enim per modum determinabilis (ed.: determinabilibus), differentia vero per

contracted to species, not only is the genus conceived more clearly, but a new *ratio* is also added. In fact, from the most general genera to the most special species every step along the Porphyrian tree is a contraction that involves not only the explication of what was only implicit in the genus, but also the addition of a new *ratio*.⁹ Further, Auriol maintains explicitly that this addition of the *ratio* is due to the object, it is not a purely psychological difference (*alietas rationis se tenet ex parte obiecti*).¹⁰ That is to say that, Dreiling to the contrary, there is a direct extra-mental ground for our universal concepts.¹¹

So far as I know, Auriol never gives a systematic account of the various ways he uses the term '*ratio*'. In practice Auriol sometimes seems to use '*ratio*' as a synonym for 'concept' or 'intention'. But when he comments explicitly on the way a *ratio* relates to a concept, Auriol says that a *ratio* partly determines the content of a concept. The *ratio* for Auriol is "what is able to be conceived" (*id quod est conceptibile*); we may call it a "conceptible". Thus, a *ratio* ex-

modum determinantis formaliter, et ideo genus se habet ut substratum respectu differentiae. Ista enim ambae rationes, tam substrati determinabilis quam rationis determinantis, remanent in constituto ex eis."

9 Note that the contraction of the concept of being to the most general genera (or any other concept, for that matter) is by way of explication only, because every thing and every *ratio* exists. For Auriol nothing escapes the concept of being: if one can have an intellectual acquaintance with x , then one can form the concept of being and predicate it of x , and the difference then is the purely psychological one of explication. Auriol's solution avoids the undesirable feature that being is like a genus contracted by outside 'qualitative' differences. On Auriol's theory of the concept of being in its historical context, see esp. Brown 1964 and Brown 1965.

10 *Rep. in Primum*, d. 2, pt. 2, q. 1, in Brown 1995: 236: "Et nota quod qualiter contractio fit isto modo per modum explicationis tantum docet Avicenna V *Metaphysicae*. Intendit enim quod talis explicatio non fiat per additionem rationis obiectivae sed tantum penes alium modum cognoscendi. Nam quando entitatem simpliciter contraho explicando per lapideitatem non addo rationem novam, sed eandem prius implicitam explico. Ideo est ibi tantum alius modus cognoscendi. Implicitum enim et explicitum sunt conditiones actus. Alietas autem rationis se tenet ex parte obiecti. Propter quod, concipere explicite et concipere implicite tantum sunt differentiae actus; non autem requirunt differentiam aliquam alterius et alterius rationis in obiecto." On Auriol's use of the term *modus concipiendi* or *cognoscendi* (they are synonyms) see Friedman 1997b.

11 Cf. also *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §44: 255, where Auriol sets second intentions apart from concepts of individuals and universal concepts of the first intention because "conceptus ille sit totaliter formatus ab intellectu, sicut 'genus',

ists prior to conception, and it is what contributes the core content to our concepts, this core content then being modified by the way that we conceive it (our *modus concipiendi*) – this is the basis of Auriol's ideas on explication that we saw above.¹² Elsewhere, Auriol makes it still more explicit that a *ratio* is any entity that can serve as a foundation for intellectual acquaintance.¹³ Moreover, every individual thing has a number of *rationes*. Take for instance Socrates and Plato:

... because they [Socrates and Plato] add the *ratio* of corporeality to the *ratio* of substance, and to the *ratio* of body [that of] sensibility, and to the *ratio* of animal [that of] rationality, but add to rationality absolutely nothing, therefore Socrates and Plato have utterly the same *ratio*, although they are really (*realiter*) distinct.¹⁴

Four things can be concluded on the basis of this passage, all of which are important to Auriol's theory of essential predication. The first is that every individual thing has a number of *rationes* or conceptibles, and these conceptibles are in some sense distinct

'species', 'syllogismus', et sic de intentionibus secundis." The text that Perler presents in this article is a crucial one for any interested in Auriol's philosophical psychology, but Perler's introduction to Auriol's ideas (esp. pp. 235-36, 239) relies too heavily on Dreiling (e.g. p. 239, n. 38, where, in an attempt to make Auriol's theory fit into Dreiling's mould, Perler misreads §§25-27 of his own text, which deal not with first intentions [as Auriol understands them], but with second intentions).

12 *Scriptum*, d. 8, ed. Buytaert: sec. 21, n. 133, 928-29, ll. 15-22: "Relinquit enim tertium modum differentiae, qui nec est realis nec rationis, sed alterius modi concipiendi eandem rem et rationem. Et si dicatur quod conceptus et ratio idem sunt, et ita si est alius conceptus, erit alia ratio; dicendum quod ratio appellatur id quod est conceptibile. Nunc autem in conceptu aliquid includitur ultra id quod est conceptibile, quia modus concipiendi. Propter quod possunt esse diversi conceptus absque diversitate conceptae rationis."

13 *Scriptum*, d. 2, ed. Buytaert: sec. 10, n. 84, p. 545, ll. 3-11: "... quaelibet propria entitas est formalis ratio obiectiva respectu intellectus. Illud enim cui competit intellectum movere per se – dictum contra 'per accidens' et contra 'per aliud' – videtur esse formalis ratio obiectiva. Formali namque rationi hoc competit ut nec per aliud moveat nec per accidens. Sed quaelibet entitas intellectum movet per se, contra per accidens et contra per aliud. Quod patet quia inter omnes realitates intellectus distinctionem ponit, quod facere non posset si unam attingeret alia mediante. Ergo quaelibet propria entitas est formalis ratio obiectiva."

14 *Scriptum*, d. 2, ed. Buytaert: sec. 9, n. 69, p. 493, ll. 85-95: "... quia <Sortes et Plato> addunt ad rationem substantiae rationem corporeitatis, et ad rationem corporis sensibilitatem, et ad rationem animalis rationabilitatem, et ad rationabilitatem autem penitus nihil addunt; idcirco, Sortes et Plato sunt penitus eiusdem rationis, quamvis realiter distinguantur."

from each other, while still all belonging to the same thing (*res*). Secondly, although these *rationes* are in some sense distinct from each other, they can also merge, one *ratio* acting as a substrate for another and yielding a third *ratio*; this is what we saw Auriol maintain above.¹⁵ Thirdly, it is clear that *rationes* are shared among individuals of the same species: Socrates and Plato differ really, but have the same *ratio*. Finally, these *rationes* are elements of Socrates' quiddity: they are essential properties.¹⁶

What seems to be of first importance with regard to a *ratio* for Auriol, however, is that it is the most basic unit of intellectual acquaintance. There is a fundamental relationship between a *ratio* and an intellect: of its very nature each *ratio* can serve as the basis for a concept. A *ratio* is simply an extra-mental feature or aspect that in-and-of itself partially fixes or determines the content of our concepts. So one really distinct thing, e.g. Socrates, can serve as the foundation of various concepts on the basis of all of its different *rationes*: one concept corresponding to the *ratio* of human being, one corresponding to the *ratio* of rationality, and so on. Thus what we have seen Auriol to claim, that "it is the nature of every singular thing to make one more concept of itself" beomes a little clearer. Each individual thing has several *rationes* or conceptibles that direct the mind to form certain concepts. These *rationes* are the one thing's disposition or aptitude to create certain concepts of itself. Because the *rationes* are shared, so the concepts are shared. Thus, on this reading of Auriol (and against Dreiling's reading), even if Socrates were the only human being with whom I ever had intellectual acquaintance, I would still form the concept human being. This is because Socrates has a metaphysical characteristic – his *ratio* – that directs me to form this concept; no comparison of Socrates' qualitative resemblance to other members of the species is necessary in order to predicate human being of him (as Dreiling would have it).

¹⁵ See n. 8.

¹⁶ Cp. n. 14 with n. 4 above. Yet another conclusion that I will add without proof is that Auriol is here adopting a modist ontological framework of *operationes* or *apparentia* that make the form known. See on this, Friedman 1997b.

Intentions, Intentional Existence, and Essential Predication

But what exactly does it mean that a *ratio* directs the mind to form certain concepts? The aspect of Auriol's doctrine that pulls together what we have seen so far is his theory of intentions and intentional existence. For Auriol, intentions are concepts. First intentions are concepts formed through direct intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental things. This is in contrast to second intentions, which for Auriol are formed without direct acquaintance with the extra-mental, but rather through the intellect's reflecting on its own concepts. Included in the class of concepts Auriol calls first intentions are universal concepts expressed by words like 'human being', 'animal', 'rose', 'flower'.¹⁷

What are these concepts or first intentions? In one of his central psychological texts, Auriol goes through an elaborate process of elimination. He denies that a concept can be any type of representative or token of the thing, if this representative has real – albeit mental – being. Examples that he gives of solutions of this sort are that the intention might be the intellectual act or an intelligible species or any type of accident terminating an act of the understanding: all of these inhere in the soul subjectively. If any of these were a concept, then when I predicated animal of human being, I would make a false predication, inasmuch as concept human being would not **be** concept animal. A predication of this sort would be as faulty as claiming 'Socrates is Plato', given that

¹⁷ *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a §64: 262 : "Secundum hoc igitur patet quod ... <intentio> est ipsemet conceptus obiectivus per intellectum formatus claudens indistinguibiler conceptionem passivam et rem quae concipitur per ipsum. Et idem est dictum intentio quod conceptus, et intentio prima idem quod conceptus primi ordinis, quos intellectus format circa res non reflectendo se super suos conceptus." Cf. above n. 11.

For a discussion of Auriol's place in the medieval discussion of intentionality and intentional existence see Katherine Tachau's contribution to this volume. Two of the more important works dealing with Auriol on intentions and concepts are Pinborg 1974 and Tachau 1988 (esp. pp. 85-112); see too Friedman 1997a, which sets Auriol's concept theory into its trinitarian context and also contains critical editions of *Scriptum* d. 9, pt. 1, and d. 27, pt. 2. Perler 1994b gives a helpful general picture of Auriol's ideas on concepts and intentional existence, but must be read with caution on some of the details it argues for; for an example, see below, n. 26.

Socrates and Plato are two different human beings.¹⁸ For much the same reason, we cannot allow Plato's solution to the problem of universals, that animal and human being as such (*ut sic* or *in quantum huiusmodi*) have any real extra-mental existence.¹⁹ The problem with theories of universals of this sort, according to Auriol, is that on them universals would not be universals at all, but would be particulars.

A second set of arguments used by Auriol points him to an answer to the question of what a concept is. If concepts were some type of representative with subjective being inhering in the soul, according to Auriol, or if concepts were Platonic ideas, then we would never have intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental things themselves, since our knowledge would extend only to these really existing entities.²⁰ On the other hand, if our concepts were particular things in the extra-mental world as they exist extra-mentally – a final alternative Auriol offers – we would be unable to make universal judgements of any kind, since there would be nothing universal about our knowledge: instead of knowing that all mules are sterile, we would know only that this mule is sterile and that that mule is sterile.²¹

18 *Scriptum*, d. 27, pt. 2, in Friedman 1997a: 432, ll. 487-90: "... conceptus esset falsus quo intra nos intuemur rosam esse florem, si vel rosa et flos quae praesentia experimur species essent intelligibiles, vel species in phantasmate, vel actus intellectus, vel formae accidentales existentes in mente: non enim unum esset aliud, si sic foret."

19 *Ibid.* in Friedman 1997a: 433-34, ll. 508-15: "Non potest etiam dari quintum, videlicet quod flos vel rosa quos in animo praesentialiter experimur sicut existentes extra in aliqua realitate Tum quia nec praedicationes essent verae unius taliter subsistentis de alio subsistente; tum quia nec scientiae essent de particularibus, sed de talibus subsistentibus rebus, nec, scito quod omnis triangulus habet tres, aliquid noscerem de particulari triangulo."

20 For this argument used about concepts having subjective being in the soul, see *ibid.* in Friedman 1997a: 433, ll. 495-99: "Tum quia nec scientiae nec definitiones nec disputationes essent de rebus quae sunt extra, quia non disputamus nisi de flore et rosa quos in anima praesentia intellectualiter experimur. Si ergo ista fuerint actus vel species et ibi sistitur, numquam disputamus nec habemus scientiam de rebus quae sunt extra, et sumus caeci circa ea." See above, n. 19, for the same argument used about Platonic ideas.

21 *Ibid.* in Friedman 1997a: 434, ll. 521-31: "Non potest etiam poni sextum, quod videlicet particulares rosae vel flores ut sunt extra in rerum existentia particulariter et distincte sint rosa vel flos simpliciter quod experimur in mente ... quia scientiae et definitiones non essent de naturis simpliciter et universalibus, sed de par-

How can we at one and the same time explain these three things: essential predication; necessary, scientific knowledge; and intellectual acquaintance with extra-mental objects? The only possibility that can allow all these at once, insists Auriol, is to maintain that concepts **are** extra-mental particulars, but having a different type of existence – a different *modus essendi* – than the real existence they have extra-mentally. Auriol calls this special type of existence ‘intentional’ or ‘objective’ existence.²² Thus Auriol claims that “in every intellection there emanates and proceeds nothing other than the cognized thing itself in a certain objective existence insofar as (*secundum quod*) it serves to terminate the intellect’s gaze.”²³ What characterizes this type of existence is that it is a particular extra-mental object, e.g. Socrates, but indistinguishably mixed together with (*indistinguibilter immiscetur*) passive conception, i.e. the formation of a concept of Socrates. A concept of Socrates **is** Socrates as conceived, it is Socrates as an object of the intellect.²⁴ Upon intellectual acquaintance, Socrates as really existing is converted through the act of conception, i.e. by being conceived, into Socrates as intentionally existing.

Socrates and a concept grasping Socrates, then, are the same thing with differing modes of existence. Auriol even says that “a thing and its intention do not differ numerically with respect to anything absolute”; they are the same thing. What thing and in-

ticularibus et individuis ut particularia et individua sunt, quod est contra Philosophum VII *Metaphysicae* et II *Priorum*, qui ait quod scire possum de omni mula quod est sterilis, vel de omni triangulo quod habet tres, et tamen ignorare de hac mula particulari”

22 Ibid. in Friedman 1997a: 434, ll. 540-43: “Relinquitur ergo ut detur septimum, scilicet quod sint verae rosae particulares et flores, non quidem ut existunt exterius, sed ut intentionaliter et obiective, et secundum esse formatum concurrunt in unum quid simpliciter, quod est praesens in intellectu per speciem intelligibilem vel per actum.”

23 Ibid. in Friedman 1997a: 429, ll. 375-77 “... in omni intellectione emanat et procedit, non aliquid aliud, sed ipsamet res cognita in quodam esse obiectivo, secundum quod habet terminare intuitum intellectus.”

24 *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §22: 248: “... obiectiva conceptio passive dicta non respicit rem per modum substrati, immo res quae concipitur est aliquid sui et immiscetur indistinguibilter sibi. Unde conceptio rosae idem est quod rosa, et conceptus animalis idem quod animal. Iste nimirum conceptus claudit indistinguibilter realitates omnium particularium animalium et quendam modum essendi, qui est intentionalis, qui non est aliud quam passiva conceptio.”

tention differ by is a respect or a relation; and this is no ordinary respect “fixed to or superimposed upon that thing, as are other relations, rather it is utterly intrinsic and indistinguishably joined to it”. This intrinsic relation, Auriol tells us, is the appearance of the thing as an object of perception (*apparere*) to a perceiver.²⁵ Hence, for Auriol, it is intrinsic to each and every thing to have two different modes of being: real or extra-mental being on the one hand, and intentional or objective being on the other. Unlike real being, the thing’s intentional being needs a perceiver in order to actualize it. This is only to say that, it is through the act of conceiving that a thing is put into intentional being. In fact, we can deduce from what we have seen of Auriol’s thought, that every particular thing, e.g. Socrates, has several potential intentional existences: one for each of Socrates’ *rationes* directing the mind to form certain concepts of him. And all of these different concepts of Socrates **are** Socrates. On Auriol’s account, this makes good sense: *rationes* are quidditative elements or essential properties without which a particular would not be the particular that it is. Thus, Socrates is not Socrates without being a rational animal, i.e. without having the *rationes* sensibility and rationality. Socrates is every bit as much a human being as he is Socrates, and upon Auriol’s theory the concept ‘human being’ is every bit as much Socrates as is the concept ‘Socrates’.²⁶ Thus upon intellectual acquaintance, Socrates (and in particular his *ratio* of rationality) directs us to form the concept ‘human being’, and that concept **is** Socrates, one of Socrates’ several potential intentional existences.

In this way Auriol attempts to deal with the problems he saw in other theories of concepts. On the one hand, he attempts to get

²⁵ *Scriptum*, d. 27, pt. 2, in Friedman 1997a: 436-37, ll. 607-12: “... considerandum est quod res in esse formato posita non claudit in se aliquid absolutum nisi ipsam realitatem. Unde non ponit in numerum res et sua intentio quantum ad aliquid absolutum, claudit tamen aliquid respectivum, videlicet apparere. Quod non debet intelligi ut affixum aut superpositum illi rei, sicut ceterae relationes, sed omnino intrinsicum et indistinguibiliter adunatum.”

²⁶ It should be noted that, pace Perler 1994b: 84 and 87, Auriol never claims that “intentional being is the thing taken in its universality” (p. 87); in fact concepts of singulars play an important role in his theory of essential predication (see e.g. *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §44: 255). I will deal with Auriol’s ideas on concepts of singulars in a forthcoming issue of *Vivarium* to be devoted to the French Franciscan.

our knowledge as firmly grounded on extra-mental things as possible: a concept simply is the intellected extra-mental particular in a different mode of being from that which it has extra-mentally; the concept, for Auriol, is essentially invisible, offering no barrier between conceiving mind and conceived object. At the same time, however, Auriol wants to preserve the universality of universal concepts and their use in essential predications, and he thinks that his theory of concepts does just that. Auriol is clear that a universal concept **is** all of its particulars: rose **is** all particular roses, animal **is** all particular animals. That is to say, animal is concept and every really-existing animal at the same time, so much so that Auriol claims:

... one should make the same judgement about a first intention as about a true thing, thus if this is in the first mode of *per se* (*per se primo modo*): 'animal is a true thing', so is this: 'animal is a first intention'. For in each of them being is predicated: in the first real being, in the second intentional being. Since animal, then, ... is not composed from reality and reason (*ratio*) as from two distinguishable [parts], but is something simply and indistinguishably joined together, both 'true thing' and 'first intention' can be predicated *per se* of it, because these are not parts, and are predicated in the first mode (*in primo modo*) ...²⁷

The concept animal **is** every thing whose nature it is to cause that concept upon intellectual acquaintance; this is because the concept is every such thing indistinguishably mixed together with passive conception. The concept 'animal' is all animals in intentional existence, because, as Auriol tells us, the same concept, animal, is formed upon intellectual acquaintance with any animal since all animals have the same *ratio*, sensibility.²⁸ Here lies the reason why Auriol, when he asks where the unity of a species lies, claims that it is "potentially and inchoatively in extra-mental things" and yet

27 *Scriptum*, d. 23, in Perler 1994a, §23: 248-49: "... idem est iudicium de prima intentione et de vera re, unde si ista est per se primo modo 'animal est vera res' et ista 'animal est prima intentio'. In utraque namque praedicatur ens: in prima ens reale, in secunda ens intentionale. Cum igitur animal ... nec sit compositum ex realitate et ratione tamquam ex duobus quae distinguibilia sint, sed sit aliquid simplicissime et indistinguibiliter adunatum, tam 'vera res' quam 'prima intentio' praedicari possunt per se de ipso, quia non se habent per modum partis, et praedicantur in primo modo"

28 *Rep. in Secundum*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 1, p. 106aD: "... quando praedicatur homo de Sorte et Platone, homo non est res alia a Sorte et Platone, nec tamen est una res in ipsis nisi unitate rationis, quae consistit in uno concipi, quia omnes illae res, puta Sortes et Plato et sic de aliis, conveniunt in uno concipi passive, et ideo sub illa ra-

the species is only actualized in the concept.²⁹ Extra-mental things of their very nature direct us to form certain concepts of themselves, and these concepts are shared because the features they are based on – the *rationes* – are shared.

Conclusion

By way of returning to the question with which this article started – “what does Auriol mean when he says that ‘Socrates’ and ‘human being’ are the same thing grasped by different concepts” – I think that we are now in a position to give a sketch of Auriol’s ideas on essential predication. It is the nature of the discrete thing, Socrates, as he exists in real extra-mental being to make a number of first intentions or concepts of himself, based on the various *rationes* that he possesses. These *rationes* are quidditative elements and they are conceptibles, characteristics of Socrates that direct the mind to form various universal concepts, which **are** Socrates, but Socrates in intentional existence. Because Plato and John and Mary all have the same *rationes* as do Socrates, differing only because they are different individual things (*res*), they too by their very nature make the same universal concepts of themselves, and these universal concepts **are** all of the individuals of their class because first intentions are thing and passive conception indistinguishably mixed together. Thus when Auriol says that ‘Socrates’ and ‘human being’ are the same thing grasped by different concepts he means it literally. Both of these concepts **are** Socrates. They differ merely intentionally, because it is Socrates’ nature to make many concepts of himself.

In this paper I have sketched Peter Auriol’s views on universal concepts and essential predication. In particular I have tried to show the way that Auriol’s theory is coherent in the sense that the disparate philosophical elements of which it is composed are logi-

tione attinguntur unica intellectione et uno intelligi et ideo est una ratio quae non est aliud quam unitas conceptus ...” Cf. also above, n. 24.

²⁹ *Rep. in Secundum*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 4, p. 109aD: “Ideo si quaeras, unitas specifica humanitatis in quo est formaliter? Dico quod in humanitate, non in animalitate, sed ut concepta est, et hoc modo idem est quod conceptus obiectivus hominis; sed illa unitas est in re extra in potentia et inchoative” This passage was adduced against Dreiling by Paul Vignaux in *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, t. XI¹ sv. Occam, column 887.

cally interconnected and self supporting. Of course, the fact that Auriol's theory is coherent does not guarantee that his ideas are philosophically tenable. For one thing, the whole notion of intentional existence at the heart of Auriol's views on essential predication is problematic and was recognized to be so by Auriol's contemporaries.³⁰ A first step along the way to determining the philosophical viability of Auriol's ideas on essential predication and universal concepts will be the charting of the medieval reception of his views, in itself a part of the process of determining Auriol's role in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century debate on these central issues at the boundary of metaphysics, logic, and philosophical psychology.³¹

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³⁰ See for a thorough consideration of the merits and demerits of intentional being, Adams 1987: 73-105.

³¹ See for a good introduction to this debate Adams 1982. It should be mentioned that Auriol's ideas on universal concepts seem to be a well elaborated version of Henry of Harclay's ideas which both Walter Burley and William of Ockham attacked (see Adams 1982: 429-34).

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